Ankara/Istanbul: Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP (Republican People’s Party), is facing the biggest crisis in its recent history. Party leader Özgür Özel has announced that he will leave the party and found a new one—a move that could have lasting consequences for Turkey’s political landscape.

Image: Socialmedia/Özgür Özel

The Trigger

Özel had taken over the leadership of the CHP from Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in november 2023. That leadership election was legally challenged, and a court recently declared the party congress in question null and void under the doctrine of “mutlak butlan” (absolute nullity). As a result, Kılıçdaroğlu was formally reinstated as party chairman, and Özel’s claim to leadership was revoked.

Rather than accept the ruling, Özel announced on july 21, in an emotional farewell speech before the CHP parliamentary group, that he would found a new party. More than 90 of the 135 MPs are expected to follow him; numerous provincial chairs, local politicians, and over 200,000 party members have already declared their resignation from the CHP. The new formation is expected to be officially registered with the Interior Ministry by july 27 at the latest.

From Inclusion to Problem Child

What is remarkable about Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is the fact that he was celebrated by the West as a preferred candidate simply because he belongs to the alevi sect—just like Bashar al-Assad—even though he has already lost to Erdoğan 12 times. It is not without reason that he is accused of sabotaging elections to prevent a promising challenger to Erdoğan.

Is Atatürk’s Founding Party Ruined?

Assessments diverge. On the one hand, the scale of the split is historic: observers expect that the new party could push the CHP down to fifth place in parliament. International news agencies also warn that a divided opposition electorate is likely to structurally benefit the ruling AKP.

On the other hand, Özel does not see himself as a splitter yet as the continuation of the party’s genuine grassroots base under a new name. International media assess the move in different ways—ranging from a “bold move that could reshape Turkish politics” to a “historic turning point.” One thing is clear: who will be regarded as the “real CHP” will be decided at the ballot box in the coming months, not at the negotiating table.

Will Özel Also Be Sidelined?

Parallels with the case of Ekrem İmamoğlu are hard to ignore. The former mayor of Istanbul and CHP presidential candidate was arrested in march 2025 on charges of corruption and terrorism—a move the European Commission at the time described as “deeply concerning.” Critics across the board interpreted the arrest as a politically motivated attempt to eliminate Erdoğan’s strongest rival.

An investigation has already been underway against Özel since november 2025, led by the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office, over alleged insults against public officials. Turkish commentators openly discuss the possibility that Özel, too, could be stripped of his immunity and imprisoned, similar to previous opposition figures—a kind of systematic “root eradication” of the opposition. Özel himself has repeatedly stated that he is fully aware of and willing to accept the consequences of his course.

Why the EU Prefers Erdoğan

Brussels reacted noticeably cautiously to Özel’s recent removal from power: the European Commission merely expressed “concern” and reminded Turkey, as an EU candidate country, of minimum democratic standards. The Party of European Socialists (PES) went further, openly comparing the developments to İmamoğlu’s arrest.

That the EU, despite repeated criticism of Turkey’s domestic politics, refrains from taking substantial action has one main reason: the 2016 refugee agreement. Both Kılıçdaroğlu and Özel have repeatedly pledged, as a core promise of a CHP-led government, to return around three million Syrian refugees within two years—a policy shift that, from the EU’s perspective, could create new uncertainties and potentially trigger renewed migration flows toward Europe. This likely gives the EU additional incentive not to disrupt the status quo with Erdoğan.

Özel’s EU Policy: More Than Rhetoric?

Unlike Erdoğan, who has effectively frozen the EU accession process since 2018, Özel positions himself programmatically as pro-European. He campaigns with slogans such as a “visa-free Europe,” promises to implement the Copenhagen criteria, and has called in letters to EU decision-makers for a more comprehensive strategic partnership between Ankara and Brussels. He has also proposed simultaneous full EU membership for both parts of Cyprus as a solution to the long-standing dispute.

Yet structural obstacles—from the Cyprus issue to widespread European skepticism toward Turkish full membership—exist regardless of who governs in Ankara.

Conclusion

The future of Turkey’s opposition will be decided in the coming hours: on whether Özel’s new party actually secures the promised unified majority in parliament. Yet there is no answer to the question of whether the Turkish judiciary will also move against him—or what will happen if it does.

Okay Altinisik | 24-7-2026, 2:56:27