Vienna/Budapest: Hungary’s new government under Prime Minister Péter Magyar has today officially initiated proceedings to remove President Tamás Sulyok from office. A prior ultimatum expired without response — Sulyok is not backing down.

Image: Facebook/Péter Magyar

Who is Tamás Sulyok — and why does Magyar want him gone?

Sulyok has been President of Hungary since march 5, 2024. Previously, he served as President of the Constitutional Court from 2016 to 2024. His nomination was made by the parliament then dominated by Orbán’s Fidesz party.

Magyar openly calls him a “puppet” of Orbán. The accusation is specific: Magyar claims Sulyok remained silent in recent years when democratic principles or social groups came under pressure — whether regarding restrictions on freedom of assembly, the activities of the Sovereignty Protection Office, or attacks on the Tisza Party itself. Sulyok consistently responded with the same argument: these were political matters in which a head of state should not intervene. For Magyar, this is precisely the proof: the role of the head of state is not limited to signing laws and performing representative duties — the office must embody national unity and safeguard the democratic functioning of the state.

A constitutional amendment as a tool — yet not an easy path

The Tisza Party holds the necessary two-thirds majority in the new parliament to pass constitutional amendments. Numerically, Magyar has the means. However, the situation is more complex than it initially appears.

In december 2025, the parliament still dominated by Fidesz passed a constitutional amendment that significantly complicates the removal of a president: the final binding decision on dismissal was transferred to the Constitutional Court — led by Péter Polt, another Orbán loyalist. Critics at the time described this amendment as an institutional safeguard against a future change of power — and it is now having its intended effect.

Magyar has responded by announcing that the government will not rely on the existing impeachment procedure yet will instead introduce its own constitutional amendment — with the declared aim of restoring rule-of-law and democratic checks and balances, based on the mandate of the april 12 parliamentary election.

How realistic is the removal?

Formally, the Tisza government has the means — the two-thirds majority is there. Politically, however, the path is full of obstacles: the institutional network of loyal judges, prosecutors, and agency heads left behind by Fidesz was deliberately designed for longevity.

In addition to Sulyok, following his electoral victory, Magyar also called on the President of the Curia, the Prosecutor General, the President of the Constitutional Court, the President of the State Audit Office, the head of the Competition Authority, and the President of the Media Authority to resign. None have complied so far.

For his part, Sulyok has already asked the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission for an opinion on the constitutional situation — a shrewd move that internationalizes the process and places Magyar under scrutiny.

Behind the power struggle

What is unfolding in Budapest is more than a personnel dispute. It is a constitutional conflict over whether a parliament legitimized by elections has the right to dismantle the institutional legacy of an authoritarian system — or whether those very legacies can prevent it.

Sulyok represents one side, Magyar the other. Who prevails will determine whether Hungary’s change in power becomes a true systemic transformation — or merely a change of government under old rules.

By Okay Altinisik | 2-6-2026, 09:08:05