Economically, this is a classic network product: its value derives not solely from the organizer, yet from the participants. When a central actor leaves the network, the utility for viewers, broadcasters, and sponsors declines—and thus again for all other stakeholders.

Image: Hayati İlker Ergün

For many people, football belongs among the most emotional events there are. For patriots, to be precise—the kind of people who believe, without reason, that they are somehow superior. For others, by contrast, it is hardly more than a primitive spectacle of 90 minutes of possession, set pieces, and predictable debates. Those in the second group are likely to regard the sport itself as something of a sleeping pill. Football often only becomes interesting where power, money, and politics come into play. And it is precisely there that the most significant conflict in the history of football is currently unfolding.

The trigger is remarkable: FIFA is planning to spin off part of its commercial rights into a new company and sell up to 20 percent of that company to private investors. UEFA views this as an impermissible privatization of world football and has today voted unanimously for a complete boycott of all FIFA competitions.

The real question, therefore, is not who is morally in the right. The more interesting question is: How much is FIFA actually worth without Europe?

An exact calculation is impossible. An economic approximation, however, would look something like this:

FIFA’s largest source of revenue is media rights. They account for around 55 percent of a World Cup’s earnings. Europe is by far one of the most valuable television markets in the world. If all UEFA nations were removed, a decline in media revenues of around 60 percent would not be an unrealistic figure. This factor alone would correspond to a loss of roughly 33 percent of total World Cup revenues.

The second-largest item is sponsorship, at around 30 percent of revenues. International corporations pay billions not only for the tournament itself, yet for its global reach. A World Cup without England, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, or the Netherlands would be a significantly weaker product for many advertising partners. A decline in sponsorship revenues of 40 to 70 percent appears plausible under these conditions. Even calculated conservatively, this would correspond to a further 15 percent of total revenues.

Then there are tickets and other revenues. Their share is approximately 15 percent. Here too, a European boycott would likely have noticeable consequences. Assuming just a 40 percent decline, another 6 percent of total revenues would be lost.

These three items alone lead to a calculated loss in value of around 54 percent. And this figure is probably still too low.

Because numbers do not capture the loss of prestige. A World Cup lives from its brand. And this brand lives from the teams that embody it. England, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal have been at the core of the Football World Cup for decades. Of all the World Cups held so far, every single title has been won exclusively by European or South American national teams. Europe regularly provides a substantial share of the favorites and a large proportion of the world’s best-known players.

Economically, this is a classic network product: its value derives not solely from the organizer, yet from the participants. When a central actor leaves the network, the utility for viewers, broadcasters, and sponsors declines—and thus again for all other stakeholders. The loss is not linear; it reinforces itself.

Thus, the actual damage could be significantly greater than the calculated 54 percent. A total collapse of between 50 and 70 percent appears quite realistic under these assumptions. Precisely for this reason, the conflict is so remarkable. It shows that while FIFA owns the “World Cup” brand, its economic value depends to a considerable extent on UEFA. The Europeans thus possess a lever that could strike at the financial core of world football.

Ironically, a sport that some regard as intellectually unstimulating due to its simplicity thereby delivers a highly instructive lesson in market value, bargaining power, and the economics of global institutions. The real game is not currently taking place on the pitch—yet in the boardrooms.

Okay Altinisik | 30-7-2026, 23:35:18